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首页  »  IMI财经观察  »  海外之声 | 德国金融监管局总裁:金融监管应给予市场创新和失败的空间(中英双语)

摘要: 金融监管是一门科学,也是一门艺术。只有将原则和法治结合在一起,才能最终实现有力的监管。

观点速递    

本文作者菲利克斯·哈菲尔德是德国金融监管局总裁。原文节选自2月1日在伦敦举行的货币金融机构官方论坛(OMFIF)城市讲座。OMFIF是一家总部位于伦敦的全球金融智库。

作者提出,金融监管既需要科学的精度和量化,也需要灵活变动、恰到好处的火候掌控。粗糙的金融监管会压制所有的风险敏感性,僵硬的规则对于动态的金融市场和个人风险状况来说是很不公平。金融监管应致力于熨平经济周期,即使在极端危机的情况下也能够平衡不同的政策和经济目标。

最后本文作者认为,只有将原则和法治结合在一起,才能最终实现有力的监管。

中文译文如下:

金融监管是一门科学,也是一门艺术

应给予市场创新和失败的空间

菲利克斯·哈菲尔德

翻译:龚周瑾

审校:肖柏高

金融监管和投资股票市场一样,既是一门科学也是一门艺术。无人质疑监管需要定量分析,但有一些问题需要人的主观判断,这些问题的答案不可能来源于算法。

分析金融市场不能与反复波动的政治和社会环境脱离。在非常时期要用非常手段。监管者在原则上必须坚定不移、始终如一,但处理单个问题需务实灵活。

排除所有的风险和可预见的不确定性对于监管者而言既不是如意的,也是不可能的。相反,监管有义务给予金融市场创新、甚至失败所需的自由。因此,职责和赔偿责任密不可分,找到最佳平衡非常重要。责任和自救的可能性应该是金融监管的最好的伙伴。银行及其客户也有权期望监管机构的可靠性。

风险敏感度的细微差别

在金融稳定与盈利的关系方面,其中一个问题是银行受资本、流动性等要求限制的程度。与此相反,金融机构需要创造利润,并为投资者购买的风险理财产品提供适当回报。

经验表明,当这种压力变大时,银行会改善或最优化其业务模式。这样做合法合理,甚至在一定程度上有助于使银行业变得更加有利可图,更具稳定性。

但总得有个限度。一些政客可能会说,如果利润由股东获得,而重大损失必须部分或完全由纳税人承担,限度就已到达。这将破坏职责与赔偿责任的统一。规定应确保不花纳税人的钱,或是仅在少数的特殊情况下使用。

有些人可能会问,本可以通过引入更高的杠杆率或类似的工具使银行业更具稳定性,为什么程序要如此复杂。这个问题的前提是有缺陷的。

经验表明,粗糙的资本管制工具会扼杀所有的风险敏感性。此外,如果金融机构必须满足统一的资本要求来保护银行存折和交易账户,那么除了承担高风险以收回高昂的资本成本之外别无选择。我相信,10%或更高的杠杆率不会引导信贷机构采取风险较低的经营方式,而将会诱导金融机构更加冒险行事。

减轻顺周期效应

风险敏感性与顺周期性的目的之间存在冲突。近年来,资产和负债估值产生的市场导向作用越来越大,使金融从业者和市场的风险状况更加透明。

在银行监管方面,这一现象随着从《巴塞尔协议I》向《巴塞尔协议III》的过渡慢慢显现。而在保险行业,《偿付能力监管标准II》的发布是一个里程碑。

市场价值取向旨在减少企业承担的风险,加强偿付能力等。此外,蒙受损失的能力也应该增强。

风险敏感性如果不适当限制,可能会将长期变动转为过度的短期波动,在繁荣阶段推动过度信贷扩张的趋势;并在经济衰退阶段更加紧缩贷款。这将对实体经济产生潜在的不利影响。

减轻顺周期效应方面已经做了很多工作。在银行监管中,设计反周期资本缓冲器是为了使金融机构在信贷过度增长期间积累额外的资本缓冲。

然而,最终不可能避免由市场估值的资本和风险与监管联系有一定程度上的顺周期性。必须在市场价值取向与审慎之间取得平衡,从而使风险监管尽可能少受顺周期效应的影响。

市场的动态性质只有在监管没有细化所有内容的情况下才能保持在正轨。监管规定本身应该形成一个原则性框架,在这个框架内有一些自由和余地,免受日常监管。

危机促生监管的需要

按照原则行事要求金融机构和监管部门之间建立密切的关系。监管部门要全面了解一个机构是否建立了适当的风险管理体系,这一点很重要。反过来,机构自己有权要求自己接受的监督是公平和可比较,以及最重要的——个性化的。

如果犯了本质性错误,要求监管受规则约束的呼声将会更加高涨。房地产危机,主权债务危机和销毁错误的丑闻是相关的例子。

大量僵硬规则对于动态的金融市场和个人风险状况来说是很不公平。另一方面,过多死守原则的规则降低了个体机构和国家合法的监管措施的可预测性和和谐性。只有将原则和法治结合在一起,才能最终实现有力的监管。

单靠模式和统计数据不能适应金融市场的现实状况,其中肯定会有风险。良好的监管机构即使在极端危机的情况下也能够平衡不同的政策和经济目标。

监管本身也有波动。相称、差异和经验教训总是重要的,受到人们欢迎;也应避免全面撤销管制。


英文原文如下:

Regulation as science and art

Markets should be given room for innovation and failure

By Felix Hufeld

Financial regulation, like investing in the stock market, is as much an art as a science. No one doubts that regulation requires quantitative analysis, but there are questions that rely on human judgement. The answers to these will not come from algorithms.

Financial markets cannot be viewed in isolation from their often volatile political and social environment. In unusual conditions, regulators must find similarly unusual solutions. While showing steadfastness and continuity in their principles, regulators must be pragmatic and flexible on individual issues.

It is neither desirable nor possible for the regulator to exclude every risk and any conceivable uncertainty. On the contrary, it is part of the regulatory mandate to give financial markets the necessary freedom for innovation and, indeed, failure. That is why it is important to seek the best possible balance between responsibility and liability, which are inseparable. Liability and the prospect of a bail-in should be the best friend of financial supervision. Banks and their customers are likewise entitled to expect dependability from regulators.

Nuance on risk sensitivity

On the relationship between financial stability and profitability, one issue is the extent to which banks must be curbed by capital, liquidity, and other requirements. Opposed to this, there is the financial institution’s need to generate profit and offer investors appropriate returns on the risk capital they provide.

Experience has shown that when this pressure becomes strong, banks seek to improve or maximise their business model. This is neither illegal nor illegitimate. It even contributes to some extent to making banking more profitable, and possibly, resilient.

But there is a limit. Some politicians might say that this limit is reached at the point where profit is distributed to shareholders but heavy losses have to be borne partially or completely by taxpayers. This would disrupt the unity of responsibility and liability. Regulation should ensure that taxpayers’ money is not used, or that it used only in limited and extraordinary circumstances.

Some may ask why proceedings must be so complicated, when it would be possible to make banks just as resilient by introducing a much higher leverage ratio or comparable tools. The premise for such a question is flawed.

Experience shows that a crude capital approach kills all risk sensitivity. Additionally if institutions have to protect their banking and trading books with flat-rate capital requirements, they are left with no alternative but to take on maximum risk in order to recoup high capital costs. I am convinced that, rather than guiding credit institutions towards a less risky way of doing business, a leverage ratio of 10% or beyond would make many financial institutions act in a riskier way.

Mitigating procyclical effects

There is a conflict between the objectives of risk sensitivity and procyclicality. In recent years, the greater market orientation of the valuation of assets and liabilities has made the risk situation of financial actors and markets more transparent.

In banking regulation, this has happened gradually with the transitions from Basel I to Basel III, while in the insurance sector the launch of Solvency II was a milestone.

The market-value orientation is intended to reduce companies’ assumption of risks and strengthen their solvency, among other things. In addition, the loss-absorbing capacity is supposed to be increased.

Risk sensitivity, if not appropriately limited, can turn long-term movements into excessive short-term volatility. It can promote the tendency towards too much credit expansion in boom phases and more restricted lending in recession phases – with potential repercussions for the real economy.

Much has been done to mitigate procyclical effects. In banking regulation, the countercyclical capital buffer was designed so that institutions should accumulate an additional capital cushion during periods of excessive credit growth.

However, ultimately it will not be possible to avoid the regulatory linking of capital and risk with market valuation to go along with some degree of procyclicality. A balance must be struck between market-value orientation and prudence which enables a risk-based regulation with the least possible procyclical effect.

The dynamic nature of the markets can only be kept on track when regulation does not spell out everything to the last detail. Regulation ought to restrict itself to forming a framework of principles within which some leeway and freedom from day-to-day supervision is granted.

Crises breed demand for regulation

Working according to principles demands a close relationship between companies and supervisors. It is important that supervisory authorities can get a full picture of whether an institution has appropriately established its risk management system. Institutions, for their part, have a right to supervision which is fair and comparable, and yet essentially individual.

Calls for greater rules-based regulation become louder if something goes fundamentally wrong: real estate crises, sovereign debt crises, and mis-selling scandals are pertinent examples.

An abundance of rigid rules cannot do justice to dynamic financial markets and individual risk profiles. Too much principles based regulation, on the other hand, reduces predictability and the harmonisation of the

legal application of supervisory measures across individual institutions and countries. It is the mix of both – a principles and a rules based approach – which ultimately makes for robust regulation.

Models and statistics alone cannot live up to the reality of financial markets, which are inconceivable without risk. Good regulators are characterised by their ability to balance differing policy and economic goals, even in situations of extreme crisis.

Even regulation itself is exposed to volatility. Proportionality, differentiation, and lessons learned are always important and welcome; full-fledged deregulation should be avoided.

Felix Hufeld is President of BaFin, Germany’s Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. This is an abridged version of an OMFIF City Lecture on 1 February in London.

观点整理  田雯

图文编辑  田雯


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